

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1069

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3736

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT:TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: U.S. STATEMENT 79TH PLENARY,
3/11/76 ROUND VI - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO 117

1. FOLLOWING ARE TWO US STATEMENTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR STOESSEL
AT 79TH PLENARY, 11 MARCH, 4:00 PM:

A. BEGIN TEXT:

WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR YOUR STATEMENT YESTERDAY
THAT THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES WITH THE US ON THE RIGHTS
AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL IN THE AGGREGATE
YIELD RANGE OF 100 TO 150 KILOTONS. AS YOU KNOW FROM
OUR TEXT, THESE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS INCLUDE CONFIRMA-
TION OF THE PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND CONFIRMATION OF GEO-
LOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL INFORMATION, WITNESSING OF THE
EMPLACEMENT AND STEMMING OF EACH EXPLOSIVE, AND OBSER-
VATION OF THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE FROM THE TIME OF
EMPLACEMENT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPLOSIVE HAS BEEN
DETONATED. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT TO
INCLUDE THE TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPLOSION, BUT DOES NOT YET INCLUDE
AGREEMENT AS TO WHO WILL TAKE SUCH PHOTOS AND PRECISELY
WHAT WILL BE PHOTOGRAPHED.

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WE AGREE THAT THE PRIMARY ISSUE IS WHETHER DESIG-

NATED PERSONNEL WILL BE PRESENT FOR EXPLOSIONS IN THIS YIELD RANGE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, OR MERELY AT THE INVITATION OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION BECAUSE SOME EXPLOSIONS MAY APPEAR TO A TELESEISMIC SYSTEM LARGER THAN IN FACT THEY WERE, AND MAY THEREBY GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE YOU CITED THE FACT THAT A 125-KT EXPLOSION MAY, IN FACT, LOOK TELESEISMICALLY LIKE A 250-KT EXPLISION, AND YOU SAID IN SUCH CASES THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION WOULD WANT TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO AVOID QUESTIONS ABOUT COMPLIANCE. HOWEVER, YOU ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT SOME EXPLOSIONS MAY APPEAR TELESEISMICALLY MUCH SMALLER THAN THEY ACTUALLY WERE. YOUR EXAMPLE, MR. MINISTER, WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN EXPLOSION OF 120 KT COULD LOOK LIKE 60 KT TO TELESEISMIC MEANS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE FOR AN EXPLOSION OF 250 KT TO LOOK LIKE 125 KT WITHOUT VALID GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION.

IF THE PRESENCE OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WERE ONLY AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION THERE EXISTS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION, FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES PROVIDED IN THE PROTOCOL, COULD ANNOUNCE THAT AN EXPLOSION OF 125 KT WAS TO BE CONDUCTED, WHEN IN FACT, BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SPECIFIC GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, THE ACTUAL YIELD WAS 250 KT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VERIFYING SIDE HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL PRESENT SO THAT GEOLOGY CAN BE VERIFIED, SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INVOLVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK. BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN A STABLE AGREEMENT. OUR APPROACH WOULD ADD MARKEDLY TO THE STABILITY OF THE RESULTS OF OUR WORK.

FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS THE REASONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHETHER DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WILL BE PRESENT IN THE YIELD RANGE 100 TO 150 KT SHOULD REST WITH THE VERIFYING SIDE.

END TEXT.

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B. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. MINISTER:

A DOMINANT ASPECT OF OUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY ON THE EQUIPMENT PROBLEM WAS THE ROLE OF CHOICE AND CHANCE IN SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT. I

WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY OUR CONCEPTION OF THE
FUNCTION OF THE SELECTION OF VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT
BEFORE THE EXPLOSION AND THE SELECTION, AFTER THE EXPLO-
SION, OF THE COMPONENTS FOR RECORDING DATA.

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF THE CHOICE PROCEDURE BEFORE
THE EXPLOSION IS THAT TWO SETS OF EQUIPMENT FOR YIELD
VERIFICATION AND TWO SETS OF SEISMIC EQUIPMENT SHALL BE
BROUGHT BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AND THAT THE PARTY
CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION SHALL SELECT ONE OF EACH OF
THESE SETS TO BE USED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. THE OTHER
SET OF EQUIPMENT WILL BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE PARTY
CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION. THESE TWO SETS WILL HAVE
THE SAME TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEDURE, AS WE SEE IT, IS
TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT CAPABILITIES IMPROPER FOR
THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
EQUIPMENT.

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THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE VERIFYING SIDE
WOULD INCUR THE RISK OF INTRODUCING COLLATERAL CAPA-
BILITIES TO OBTAIN UNWARRANTED INFORMATION IN ONE SET
WHEN THERE IS A CLEAR POSSIBILITY THAT THIS SET OF
EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SELECTED BY THE PARTY CARRYING
OUT THE EXPLOSION TO REMAIN IN ITS CUSTODY. THE SOVIET
SIDE HAS CALLED THE RETAINED SET THE "HOSTAGE SET".

INDEED, IT WOULD BE A HOSTAGE ASSURING THAT BOTH SETS OF EQUIPMENT WILL BE THE SAME.

THE OPPORTUNITY BY THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION TO EXAMINE ONE COMPLETE SET THAT IT HAS CHOSEN ITSELF, IN ITS CUSTODY, IN AS THOROUGH A MANNER AS IT WISHES, SHOULD ENABLE THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION TO ASSESS THOROUGHLY THE CAPABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT BROUGHT BY THE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, AND TO BE ASSURED THAT THE WORKING EQUIPMENT WILL NOT ACQUIRE DATA NOT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION. FURTHERMORE, THIS PROCEDURE EFFECTIVELY REMOVES CONCERNS OF THE VERIFYING PARTY THAT THE EXAMINATION CALLED FOR IN PREVIOUS PROPOSALS COULD AFFECT THE ACCURACY OR REALIBILITY OF THE WORKING EQUIPMENT TO ACQUIRE AND RECORD DATA. WE BELIEVE THIS ALSO SERVES THE INTEREST OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION SINCE THEY ARE INTERESTED IN ASSURING THE RELIABLE AND ACCURATE MEASUREMENTS ARE TAKEN. UNDER THIS PROCEDURE, PROPER FUNCTIONING OF
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EQUIPMENT IS THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VERIFYING SIDE.

LET ME TURN NOW TO THE SELECTION PROCEDURE FOR THE COMPONENTS OF EQUIPMENT FOR RECORDING DATA AFTER THE EXPLOSION. IN THIS CASE, WE ARE DEALING WITH A SITUATION ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE EXPLOSION, AND THIS DEMANDS A DIFFERENT SELECTION PROCEDURE. WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT, AFTER THE EXPLOSION, AT THE TIME THE DUPLICATES OF THE DATA HAVE BEEN OBTAINED, THE EQUIPMENT WILL HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE FIELD FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. BOTH SIDES WILL OR MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME DEGREE OF ACCESS TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE EQUIPMENT. THUS, THERE IS A CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION THAT MODIFICATION OF THE EQUIPMENT MAY CONCEIVABLY HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE EQUIPMENT SOME CAPABILITY FOR INTERCEPTING AND RECORDING UNWARRANTED DATA. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT IT IS ONLY REASONABLE FOR THE VERIFYING PARTY TO HAVE SIMILAR CONCERNS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN ALTERED OR DISABLED BY PERSONNEL OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION WHICH COULD ALTER OR DESTROY THE RECORDED DATA.

CLEARLY, WE HAVE A DIFFERENT SITUATION AFTER THE EXPLOSION THAN BEFORE THE EXPLOSION. BOTH SIDES HAVE AN OBVIOUS INTEREST IN RETAINING THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT. THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION WANTS TO RETAIN THE EQUIPMENT TO ASSURE THAT UNWARRANTED INFORMATION WAS

NOT OBTAINED; THE VERIFYING SIDE WANTS TO RETAIN THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT TO ASSURE A PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE DATA, AND TO BE SURE THAT AMBIGUOUS OR POOR DATA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY IMPROPER INTERFERENCE BY THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION.

THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A "PROCESS OF CHANCE", BY WHICH TWO SETS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT WILL BE SELECTED, MEETS THE INTERESTS OF BOTH PARTIES. THE PRESENCE OF TWO SETS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT SATISFIES THE NEED THAT EACH SIDE OBTAIN A SET. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, A SELECTION BY
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CHOICE THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED FOR THE PRE-SHOT SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE HERE. NEITHER PARTY, IN THIS INSTANCE, COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE OTHER PARTY MAKE THE SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT THEY WANT TO RETAIN. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. SIDE HAS PROPOSED A "PROCESS OF CHANCE" BY WHICH THE COMPONENTS OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT WILL BE SELECTED. THIS PROCEDURE WILL PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH PARTIES.

UNDER OUR PROCEDURE, THE RISK OF TAMPERING WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLY HIGH FOR BOTH THE VERIFYING SIDE AND THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION. BOTH ARE TREATED EQUALLY, BOTH SHARE THE RISK, AND THE INTERESTS OF BOTH ARE ADEQUATELY AND EVEN-HANDEDLY PROTECTED. END TEXT.

STOESSEL

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